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Trading in a multiplayer board game:
Towards an analysis of non-cooperative dialogue
Markus Guhe (m.guhe@ed.ac.uk), Alex Lascarides (alex@inf.ed.a.uk)
School of Informatics, Informatics Forum, 10 Crichton St, Edinburgh EH1 2HX, Scotland
Abstract
We collected and analysed a small dialogue corpus of people
playing The Settlers of Catan. Dialogues are trading negotia-
tions where Gricean maxims of cooperativity often break down
as players adopt conflicting intentions in their attempt to win
the game. This has consequences for what information players
are sharing and for the sincerity of their contributions.
In this paper, we motivate and describe a two-level scheme for
analysing non-cooperative dialogues, where both levels are in-
terdependent. Each dialogue move is a move in the game (e.g.,
an offer to trade), and a coherent contribution to the dialogue
so far, connected to a prior segment with a coherence relation,
such as indirect answerhood or rejection. Parsing and gen-
erating coherence relations is computationally feasible (e.g.,
Baldridge & Lascarides, 2005), and here we’ll argue that their
semantics help to identify the game move, even when it is im-
plicated rather than linguistically explicit.
Keywords: non-cooperative dialogue; dialogue move; negoti-
ation; The Settlers of Catan; JSettlers; multiplayer game.
Non-cooperative dialogue
Standard accounts of dialogue usually assume that the agents
cooperate with one another on at least two levels (Grice,
1975): they coordinate the conventions that govern linguis-
tic meaning (basic cooperativity); and they share attitudes to-
wards what is said, including shared intentions (content co-
operativity). Tutoring is a widely investigated example where
content cooperativity is a reasonable assumption.
But there are many dialogue scenarios where conflicting
preferences compel agents to perform dialogue moves that
aren’t content cooperative. Such situations range from differ-
ences in preferences with relatively low stakes (e.g., whether
to go to a French or an Italian restaurant) to very high, life
changing, stakes (e.g., a cross examination of a defendant by
a prosecutor in court). Lying in court has potential high re-
wards (if the lie is not uncovered) as well as high penalties (if
it is). But telling the truth or lying are just the two extremes
in a spectrum of non-cooperative behaviour. To illustrate this,
consider the following cross-examination of a defendant by a
prosecutor (from Solan & Tiersma, 2005):
(a) Prosecutor: Do you have any bank accounts in Swiss
banks, Mr. Bronston?
(b) Bronston: No, sir.
(c) Prosecutor: Have you ever?
(d) Bronston: The company had an account there for
about six months, in Zurich.
The locutionary content of both (b) and (d) are true, but
Bronston succeeds in deflecting the prosecutor’s enquiry with
a misleading implicature with (d): (d) implicates that Bron-
ston never had any Swiss bank account, and this is false.
In this paper, we describe dialogue moves in non-
cooperative situations, drawing on data from a dialogue cor-
pus of people playing The Settlers of Catan. In the corpus,
each dialogue move is aligned with a machine readable ver-
sion of the game state. We present a scheme of the types of
dialogue moves that occur in our corpus. Our eventual goal
is to build a dialogue system that plays The Settlers of Catan,
engaging in non-cooperative dialogues like humans do. For
such a system, the agent playing the game will use the dia-
logue moves from that scheme to interact with the other play-
ers so as to forward its chosen game moves. This will require
us to parse and generate the semantic content of these dia-
logue moves; we will exploit coherence relations from SDRT
for this purpose (Asher & Lascarides, 2003).
The Settlers of Catan
The Settlers of Catan is a multiplayer board game set on the
fictional island Catan. Catan is represented by a map con-
sisting of hexes (see Fig. 1; see catan.com for the full set of
rules). Two to four players settle on the island by building set-
tlements and cities connected by roads. It is a zero-sum game:
the first player to win 10 victory points wins and all others
lose. One obtains victory points by, for example, building a
settlement (1 point) or a city (2 points). To build, one needs
resources: clay, wood, rock, ore and sheep.
Players take turns and attempt to obtain resources and to
build. A turn starts with the roll of dice. Each player poten-
tially obtains or loses resources through dice rolls. This de-
pends on a combination of: the number rolled, the location of
game pieces on the board, and the resources currently held.
(So, future game states are non-deterministic, necessitating
players to calculate the risks of moves). The player whose
turn it is can trade resources with the bank or other players
and can use resources to build roads, settlements or cities.
Dialogues where the players trade resources surface dur-
ing game play as the players try to exchange resources with
one another. Their decisions about what resources they want
and what they are prepared to give up are influenced by what
they need to build, e.g. a road requires 1 clay and 1 wood.
A player can only build on a location if it touches one of his
already existing pieces (road, settlement or city); all settle-
ments and cities must be separated by at least 2 roads (of any
player). Thus, players’ decisions about trades are not only de-
termined by the decisions about what they want to build and
where they want to build it, but also by their estimates of what
will most advance, or undermine, the building strategies of
the other players (see Thomas, 2003). Players can agree any
trade; they can even lie or bluff, as found in classic concep-
tions of bargaining games (Osborne & Rubinstein, 1990).
Figure 1: A game of The Settlers of Catan in the JSettlers interface.
Modifying JSettlers for Corpus Collection
To analyse trading dialogues and to perform inferences about
an agent’s underlying game strategy, one needs a corpus
where each utterance is aligned with a machine readable ver-
sion of its synchronous game state. To this end, we adapted
an existing open source implementation of Settlers, cf. Fig. 1
(JSettlers2, version 1.1.12). JSettlers mimics the physical ver-
sion of the game in that each player can see the whole board
but only his own hand (in a colour-coded panel). In JSettlers,
trades are done graphically via the interface, see Fig. 2a. The
player whose turn it is has two panels containing ‘I Give’,
‘I Get’ and colour coded buttons for the other players – he
can offer a trade by adding appropriate values for these three
items. This prompts the players in question, who can then ac-
cept or reject the trade through button clicking.
We adapted this interface to enforce trades to be negotiated
linguistically prior to an actual exchange of resources. Specif-
ically, the buttons required to exchange resources are hidden
by a ‘Register a Trade’ button (Fig. 2b), and only one other
player can be selected via the colour coded buttons. Players
were instructed to first agree a trade via the chat interface and
only then ‘register’ the trade. Clicking ‘Register a Trade’ re-
vealed the trading interface (Fig. 2a), and enacting the trade is
achieved in the same way as the original version of JSettlers.
Negotiation dialogues
In contrast to other task-oriented dialogues, e.g., the map task
(Anderson et al., 1991; Guhe & Bard, 2008), The Settlers
a) b)
Figure 2: (a) A player’s hand panel in JSettlers. (b) The modi-
fied hand panel during normal game play. Trade is agreed via
the chat interface prior to using the panel to register the trade.
of Catan is not a cooperative game but a zero sum game:
only one player can win, all others lose. Even so, it is some-
times necessary for players to form alliances to block another
player from winning, e.g., don’t give tomm wheat, he can
win the game if he gets wheat (from dialogue 1). Because of
this, players avoid dialogue moves that might undermine their
trustworthiness; they like to appear to be cooperative even
if they aren’t actually cooperating at the content level (i.e.,
adopting a shared intention), e.g., they may reject a trade even
when they are able to perform it by saying no sorry (when
asked can I buy wood for 1 ore? and the player having wood;
from dialogue 2). Joint action takes place on multiple levels
simultaneously (Clark, 1996), and we find cooperativity on
many levels in our corpus, e.g. all players share a common
language, they follow the rules of the game, and they do ac-
tually trade with each other.
To analyse trade interactions, it is not necessary to treat
the dialogue exchanges within a single game as a single di-
alogue. Instead, they appear as chunks, especially since the
game state changes between trades (thanks to dice rolls, for
instance), leading the players to adopt different preferences
about what resources they need at the start of a new dia-
logue game, as compared to their preferences at the end of the
last one. In addition, the game is too complex for players to
reason about the complete game tree anyway; so, they struc-
ture their game space, aiming to achieve shorter term goals
by using heuristics about how to advance their goal of win-
ning (Thomas, 2003). Because of this structuring of the game
space, it is natural to analyse the dialogues in discrete chunks,
each addressing a short term goal, e.g. to obtain wood. We
adopted this subdivision into dialogue games from the analy-
sis of map task dialogues (Kowtko, Isard, & Doherty, 1993).
We collected a exploratory pilot corpus of 21 games, each
containing multiple dialogue games, which we will make
available publicly in due course. All participants were native
speakers of English and naive to the purpose of the study.
Most were students at the University of Edinburgh.
The corpus is not currently annotated because the purpose
of collecting it was to obtain a sufficient sample so as to in-
form decisions about an annotation scheme for the corpus col-
lection proper, which we are engaged in at the moment. For
this reason, we have not analysed this pilot corpus in quantita-
tive detail; e.g. with respect to differences between individual
players, linguistic features, strategies, or level of cooperativ-
ity in the dialogue moves. Instead, we report here on the range
of moves that surfaced in this corpus. There are several types
of dialogue games (sub-dialogues), e.g., clarifying the rules
of the game, discussions of the game state, small-talk, and,
most importantly, trade negotiation dialogue games, which
also are the most frequent in the corpus. Each trade negoti-
ation constitutes a dialogue game.
We analyse dialogues on two levels, a game-strategic level
and a dialogue level. Put differently, we distinguish the level
of what game move is being made and how that move is re-
alised through lexical and compositional semantics plus an
assumption that the contribution is coherent in context. This
distinction is particularly useful for building an agent that will
play The Settlers of Catan and be able to communicate with
other players using natural language. For building this agent,
the game-strategic computations should be separate from the
computations needed for understanding and generating dia-
logue moves for achieving those game strategies.
Please be aware of the potential confusion between the
terms dialogue move (or: move in a dialogue game), which
we adopt from the map task, and game move. The latter refers
to a move in the game The Settlers of Catan, e.g., building a
road, or trading 1 ore for 3 wheat, while the former refers to
a move in the dialogue or equivalently a type of speech act;
this might be a property of the utterance (e.g., to question)
or a relation (e.g., to give an indirect answer), where the suc-
cessful performance of the speech act depends on the content
of both the current utterance and a prior segment of the di-
alogue. In trading dialogues, game moves (such as to get 1
ore for 3 wheat) are achieved by performing dialogue moves
(e.g., by accepting a prior offer through uttering It’s a deal).
In trading dialogues, game moves are performed by perform-
ing a dialogue move: so accepting a trade may be performed
by performing the speech act Accept. If not further specified,
we are talking of dialogue games and dialogue moves.
Dialogue Games
Dialogue moves in the map task
We will take the twelve types of dialogue moves from the map
task (Kowtko et al., 1993) as our starting point. Six dialogue
moves initiate a new game: Instruct: Give an instruction to
the fellow player of what to do. Check: Request confirma-
tion of whether a previous utterance has been understood cor-
rectly. Query-YN, Query-W: A yes/no or wh-question about
some aspect of the task, except clarification of an instruction
(which is a Check move). Explain: Provide new information
about the goal of the task with respect to the current state.
Then, there are six further moves: Clarify: Clarify or re-
peat a prior utterance or known information. Reply-Y, Reply-
N: Elicited response to Query-YN, Check or Align. Reply-
W: Elicited response to Query-W or Check. Acknowledge:
Acknowledge understanding (can close a dialogue game.)
Ready: Indicate intention to start a new game.
Not all dialogue moves can be uniquely assigned to just
one of these classes; some fulfil multiple functions.
Dialogue games can contain sub-games, creating a nested
structure. Again, we follow Kowtko et al. (1993): ‘Nesting
is considered to occur when a sub-game is initiated whose
purpose can clearly be seen as contributing to the goal of the
current game . . . A break, such as the announcement of a mis-
understanding, puts the status of the current game in doubt;
the game might continue if the misunderstanding is cleared
up, or it might be abandoned.’ (p. 3)
We also follow Kowtko et al. in defining dialogue moves
as ‘an utterance, a partial utterance or a group of utterances,
which convey the same specific intent.’ (p. 3) In other words,
a dialogue move can consist of one constituent or several, and
if it is several constituents they may likewise be individual
constituents in a further game, thereby creating a hierarchical
structure of moves. Dialogue moves are thus defined by their
function rather than linguistic form. We provide the analysis
of this more detailed level, i.e. how utterances are related, in
terms of SDRT (Asher & Lascarides, 2003) below.
Dialogue moves in The Settlers of Catan
The dialogues in our corpus bear many similarities with map
task dialogues, but there are also significant differences.
The fundamental structure of a trade negotiation consists
of one player making an offer and another player accepting
or rejecting it. Thus, we replace the map task’s Instruct move
with the Offer and Counteroffer moves, and the moves Ac-
knowledge and Ready are supplemented by Accept, Reject
and Retract.1 The full scheme, including the dialogue moves
retained from the map task scheme, is given in Fig. 3.
Moves initiating a dialogue game
 Check
 Query-YN, Query-W
 Explain
 Align
 Offer
– Make Complete Offer
– Make Incomplete Offer
 Give Specified
 Get Specified
– Undo Trade
 Counteroffer
– Cannot Accept Proposal
– Could Accept Proposal
 Game-Strategic Comment
Other moves
 Clarify
 Reply-Y, Reply-N
 Reply-W
 Acknowledge
 Ready
 Accept
 Complete Offer
 Reject
– Cannot Trade
– Won’t Trade
 Retract
 Null-move
Figure 3: Dialogue moves in The Settlers of Catan.
The Offer, Counteroffer and Reject moves have subtypes.
For Offers, apart from the rare Undo Trade move, where
a player requests to reverse a trade, the main distinction is
whether an offer is complete. With Make Complete Offer
a player specifies precisely both what he is prepared to give
and what he wants in return, and from whom. In Make In-
complete Offer a player only specifies some values of the
trade (e.g., the resource she wants, but not how much, nor
from whom, nor for what). Give Specified dialogue moves
only specify what the player wants to trade (Does anybody
want clay?) Get Specified (I need clay.) is similar.
As we are investigating the non-cooperative aspect of dia-
logue, we subdivide Reject moves into those where the player
Cannot Trade because he lacks the required resources, and
Won’t Trade, where he could make the trade but chooses not
to. Because we record the game states, we can distinguish
Cannot Trade from Won’t Trade by looking at the resources
of the speaker. Analogously, Counteroffers can be made be-
1Instruct is a very map task specific dialogue move – in the map
task one person instructs another person to draw a route on a map.
While in The Settlers of Catan a player may give an instruction to
another player, no player is obliged to follow it. Particularly in trade
negotiations, no player can instruct another player to do something,
which is why we are dropping it here.
cause the player Cannot Accept the Proposal or Could Ac-
cept the Proposal but does not want to do so.
As in the map task scheme, dialogue moves aren’t mutually
exclusive, e.g., a Counteroffer (of either type) can also be a
Make Incomplete Offer (from dialogue 19): Hardie: i’ll trade
2 wheat for 1 wood – Gytis: I need clay or ore. Taken by itself,
Gytis’s dialogue move is simply a Make Incomplete Offer,
but in this context, it is also a Counteroffer (he wants clay
or ore instead of wheat). Note that the Counteroffer is drawn
from both what Gytis says and what Hardie says, and to infer
this particular Counteroffer one needs to draw on the analysis
at the second (the discourse) level, see the next section. It is
through recognising the coherence relation between Gytis’s
contribution and Hardie’s, and reasoning about that relation’s
semantics that one infers that Gytis has implicated acceptance
of a part of Hardie’s offer, i.e. give Hardie 1 wood.
We add some more dialogue moves to this scheme. Players
can start a new sub-game by making Game-Strategic Com-
ments in the context of trade dialogues, e.g. don’t give tomm
wheat, he can win the game if he gets wheat (dialogue 1).
A Complete Offer move completes the trade offer of a
Make Incomplete Offer move by specifying the missing in-
formation: i.e., it differs from Counteroffer in that no part of
the original offer is rejected. Further, as long as a trade has
not been concluded, a player who has offered a trade may
Retract the offer. Finally, because The Settlers of Catan is a
multiplayer game, a player can decide to stay silent and not
to respond to a trade offer. This is a Null-move.
Because dialogues are entirely unrestricted, trade dialogue
games can be interrupted by other types of dialogue games,
e.g. a dialogue game on how to use the hand panel, cf. Fig. 2.
We do not consider these cases here.
Sincerity and Informativeness
Players can be non-cooperative in at least two ways. First, a
player P2’s response to P1’s prior move may reject the goal
that underlies P1’s prior utterance, even though he was in a
position to fulfil that goal: a Won’t Trade move, e.g., P1 asks
for wheat and P2 responds no, sorry despite having wheat.
Second, a speaker’s utterance may semantically entail and/or
implicate content they know to be false. While a player can in
principle perform an insincere dialogue move other than Re-
ject, e.g. Offer, in practice such moves are rare (they have lit-
tle foreseeable benefit but foreseeable penalties should the lie
be exposed). So insincere moves tend to be rejections; indeed,
they tend to be Won’t Trade (and not Can’t Trade) rejections.
Our corpus exhibits the whole range from sincere state-
ments to outright lies. We mainly distinguish sincere rejec-
tions from deflections and lies. In the following examples
from our corpus, we specify the resources a player has when
making an utterance by using the abbreviations c (clay), o
(ore), s (sheep), wh (wheat) and wo (wood).
Sincere rejection. Sincere rejections of both subtypes are
possible. A move is sincere only if declarations of the player’s
resources are truthful. For example, amz’s utterance below is
a sincere Can’t Trade move; Joe’s and Luke’s utterances are
sincere Won’t Trade moves (all taken from dialogue 8):
amz[c=0jo=0js=1jwh=1jwo=1] i dont have any clay
Luke[c=1jo=0js=0jwh=1jwo=0] I have one clay but I want it
for myself?
Joe G[c=1jo=0js=1jwh=0jwo=0] sorry, i’m holding on to
mine
Deflection. Deflections are misleading implicatures as de-
scribed earlier; the folowing extract from dialogue 2 yields a
misleading scalar implicature (since Tomm has wheat):
Cat[c=0jo=2js=0jwh=2jwo=1] anyone for ore or wheat?
Thomas[c=2jo=2js=0jwh=2jwo=3] i have ore
Lie. Lies are moves where a player declares false informa-
tion, e.g., this Reject from dialogue 7:
Lorelei1292[c=0jo=1js=3jwh=9jwo=1] can anyone give me
some clay for some wheat?
AM123[c=2jo=0js=0jwh=2jwo=1] sorry have none of that!
Even assuming AM123 misunderstood the direction of the
trade offer, the only available antecedents for resolving the
anaphoric expression none of that are wheat and clay; thus,
AM123’s utterance declares content she knows to be false.
Null-move. Trade offers can also be rejected by not answer-
ing at all (from dialogue 11):
Britt[c=1jo=1js=5jwh=0jwo=0] anyone in need of sheep?
Simon[c=0jo=0js=2jwh=4jwo=0] no thanks
David A[c=0jo=1js=1jwh=2jwo=0] hnulli
Din[clay=0jore=1js=1jwh=1jwo=1] hnulli
Limited informativeness. It is strategically important to
decide how much information about one’s own hand a player
is willing to reveal. Deflections are a prime example for this.
Volunteering information. In contrast to the limited coop-
erativity exhibited in, for instance, Null Moves, there are also
many instances of players behaving much more cooperatively
than strictly speaking they need to in order to advance the
domain-level game. For instance (from dialogue 3):
Euan[c=0jo=0js=2jwh=2jwo=1] Anyone got any ore?
Cardlinger[c=0jo=1js=0jwh=7jwo=3] only the 1
Joel[c=0jo=0js=2jwh=2jwo=1] havent had it in awhile
One possible explanation for why players might choose to
provide more specific content than simply a direct answer to
the question is that by doing so they are more likely to be
perceived as cooperative and providing positive face to their
interlocutors (Brown & Levinson, 1978), which may be use-
ful later in the game.
The Dialogue Level: SDRT
The previous section detailed dialogue moves on the agent
level. Now we describe how those moves interact with con-
tent at the dialogue level. This link between dialogue moves
on the one hand and coherence relations and semantics on
the other, is needed for identifying which dialogue moves (or
communicative intentions) an agent has revealed during lan-
guage interpretation, and it is needed for deciding which ut-
terances (or dialogue moves) to make during language pro-
duction.
Consider the utterance I need clay. Without any context,
this is a Make Incomplete Offer move. But in the exchange
A: I want wood. B: I need clay. the same utterance has to be
understood in relation to the content of the previous utterance.
Reasoning about its coherent use in context leads one to infer
that it is a Complete Offer dialogue move.
We are using the framework of Segmented Discourse Rep-
resentation Theory (SDRT, Asher & Lascarides, 2003; Las-
carides & Asher, 2009) for specifying such coherence rela-
tions. In SDRT’s model of dialogue, each dialogue agent pub-
licly commits to coherence relations between his own utter-
ance and prior ones, even if they were said by another agent.
Shared public commitments then reveal agreed content; in-
consistent public commitments reveal disputes. For instance,
above, B commits to the coherence relation Plan-Elab(a;b)
(where a is A’s utterance and b is B’s). This means that b
provides information that elaborates a plan for achieving the
communicative intention underlying a. Plan-Elab is a veridi-
cal relation: a public commitment to Plan-Elab(a;b) entails
a commitment to the contents of a and b. Thus B is commit-
ted to a: he implicates endorsement of it by the illocutionary
effects of the speech act Plan-Elab that he performed.
Such moves reveal commitments to preferences as well; in
our domain, these preferences are (partial) information about
offers that an agent would prefer to perform. Cadilhac, Asher,
Benamara, and Lascarides (2011) describe a detailed algo-
rithm for computing such preferences from the dialogue’s
content. It exploits the recursion over the discourse structure
that is engendered by coherence relations to build a partial
description of each player’s preferences, as it evolves through
the dialogue exchange, e.g.:
A: I am prepared to give you rock for wood.
B: I need clay.
The relation between these utterances is a Plan-correction,
because B corrects A’s offer. The Cadilhac algorithm for con-
structing B’s declared preference in context yields that the
implied trade is clay for wood. Thus, it computes which part
of the prior trade was rejected (i.e., getting rock) and captures
implicatures about what is accepted; here, the implicature that
B accepts giving wood. While the Plan-correction relation is
between whole utterances, the bits that are accepted and re-
jected are computed on the basis of the semantics of the re-
lation and the semantics (and information structure) of the
arguments (Lascarides & Asher, 2009). In contrast, in
A: [I want wood.]a1 [What do you want?]a2
B: [I need clay.]b
two discourse relations are at work Q-Elab(a1;a2) and
IQAP(a2;b). Q-Elab(a1;a2) means that a2 is a question
whose possible answers all elaborate a plan for achieving
the underlying communicative intention of a1. IQAP (Indirect
Question Answer Pair) relates a question (a2) to a segment (b)
whose content, together with shared knowledge, defeasibly
implies a direct answer to the question.
Default principles for identifying the scope of implicit en-
dorsements and denials from Lascarides and Asher (2009)
also mean that B accepts Q-Elab(a1;a2). In other words, by
committing to the question (via the veridical IQAP), B im-
plicates a commitment also to the question’s illocutionary ef-
fects, here Q-Elab(a1;a2). This relation, not the content of
a2 itself, yields an interpretation of the question equivalent to
What do you want in exchange for wood? Thus B’s trade offer
b is a combination of A’s and B’s contributions.
A typical case from our pilot corpus (dialogue 19) demon-
strates that such interactions can be even more complex:
Hardie: [anyone got ore?]a1 [1-1 for either clay or wheat?]a2
Gytis: [I could give 1 ore for 2 clay]b
Gytis’s utterance is related in multiple ways to Hardie’s
Plan-Elab(a1;a2). First, through b, Gytis commits to a Plan-
correction on Hardies Plan-Elab(a1;a2): he chooses clay
over wheat and wants 2 ore instead of 1. Second, he commits
to IQAP(a1;b): he indirectly answers he has ore. Finally, he
commits to Plan-Elab(a1;b): a1 reveals Hardie’s incomplete
offer for getting ore, which Gytis’s response completes.
Thus, without a principled account of discourse relations
like SDRT and an algorithm like the one by Cadilhac et al.
(2011) for extracting declared preferences from dialogue con-
tent, it will be far from straightforward to map actual dialogue
into a representation of the underlying trade, or generate dia-
logues that express one’s intended trade.
Conclusion
We have collected a pilot corpus of trading dialogues within
the zero-sum game The Settlers of Catan. These dialogues re-
veal non-cooperative dialogue to be a nuanced affair: while
Gricean maxims of cooperativity break down, basic coopera-
tivity is adhered to and speakers often share intentions.
We argued for two interleaved levels of analysis: a game
level on which dialogue moves are particular types of game
moves; and a dialogue level where the agents’ public com-
mitments to coherent interpretations of their contributions are
recorded. Both levels are needed for a computationally feasi-
ble mapping between utterances and the agents’ preferences
during language interpretation and production. Thus, for an
agent playing The Settlers of Catan, dialogue moves are one
type of game move the agent can make and must extract from
other players’ utterances. The semantic representation that is
computed by means of coherence relations is the interface to
the linguistic subsystems.
Due to the non-cooperativeness of such dialogues, the di-
alogue moves that players make vary in their sincerity and
informativeness. We highlighted moves from our corpus that
demonstrate the spectrum, ranging from fully sincere moves
through deflections to lies.
In the STAC project (STRAtegic Conversation, see ac-
knowledgments), we are currently in the process of collecting
the corpus proper, which our research partners in Toulouse
will fully annotate with SDRT relations. An implementation of
the Cadilhac algorithm will make it possible to extract pref-
erences from discourse structure to semi-automatically anno-
tate the corpus with the agents’ preferences (expressed as of-
fers). The relations among preferences, plus the game state
(in particular, a player’s resources) then serve to determine
the game moves. This will be a rich resource for building a
dialogue agent that plays The Settlers of Catan, empirically
grounding the agent’s decisions to match what people do.
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